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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
· of the . 
State of Utah 
~-\ILEEX WEBB, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
vs 
HERBERT A. S~OW, ERASTUS 
P. SSO\V·, ANN PY:L\1~1 SNOW, 
E\T.ALYN s. DEClCER AND AGNES 
S. GALLACHER, 
Defendants and Appellants. ) 
Appeal From Third District Court, Salt Lake County 
Honorable P. C. Evans, Judge 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action to recover damages resulting from 
an assault and battery ~of respondent by employes 
of appellants, taking pla~ce on the property of the 
giant racer operated by appellants, not on the load-
ing platform, as appe~lla.nts state, but on the floor 
of the entrance near G, shown on the drawing 
appearing on page 3 of appellants' brief. As shown 
on that drawing, there is no gate, fence or other 
barrier bet"\\reen the stairs and the ent:r,ance be-
tween the 'ving' fences, one of which extends h~-
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t\veen 0 and P, and \vhich flank the entrance to the 
loading platforms C and B, nor between the en-
trance and the loading· platforms themselves, nor 
.any signs to keep out. (Tr. 111).' C is the west 
'loading platform and B the east. The operating 
platform A is about 18 inches below the loading 
platforms. (Tr. 77). The black lines on the draw-
jug· which indicate the \Ving- fences, extend on south 
to a point below the cash regis,ters sho\vn on the 
op·erating plat£orm where they turn east and west 
respectively to the edge of the loading platforms 
abutting on the tracks . 
. :\s indicated on the dra,ving and testified to by 
employes of appellants, fares. are not collected fron1 
passengers on the cars. which travel over the giant 
race:r tracks until the passengers have been seated 
on the ca.rs and a bar put in place in front of them. 
(Tr. 175). On the night in question in this case 
three employes of appellants collected faresi from 
the passenge:rs) each one colle~cting fares from two 
of the six seats making up a t~ndem of cars, three 
seats to a car. On page 2 of appellants' brief it is 
sta.ted· that ''The p~ayment of the admission to 
Raltair did not entjt]e one to ride the racer - that 
called for an additional fee, which1 appellee, or .any 
of her party, never paid or offered to pay." Of 
course, as sho"\\rn above, this is a misleadin~ and un-
fair statement. And, of cours,e, the public is in-
vited to come onto appellants' racer premises. 
Counsel for appellants keep insisting (Brief, pp. 
4-5) that the cars running on the west s,et orf tracks 
were sufficient to take care of the people then de-
Riring to ride. Yet Mr. Bettilyon testified that re-
spondent .and her p!arty came into the entrance to 
the racer and ·located about at point G in the en-
tranrP. (Tr. 77). 1\frR. Bet.tilyon stated they waited 
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at about F on the entrance platform and that there 
was a crowd of people the·re and they could not get 
any closer. · They waited 15 or 20 minutes,. She 
further stated, "The crowd didn't seem to be. mov-
ing up very fast at all.~' ( Tr. 90-1). 
The scale on the drawing· shows the loading pla.t-
fornt to be 48 feet long and 6% feet wide from F 
and 0 to the south cross fence separating the load-
~ng platform from the unloading platform D and 
E. Mr. Webb testified that the west platform had 
a crowd backed up to about F on the drawing, (Tr. 
102-3) and they could not get any nearer. Only the 
cars on the w_est tracks were running. ·There was 
a tandem of cars on the east tracks, standing idle. 
(Tr. 103). Respondent and her p~rty never got 
seats in the cars and hence_ p.aid no fares. 
The evidence shows without contradiction that 
Bernard L. Bettilyon and respondent are brother 
and sister, and Kenneth Webb is respondent's hus ... 
band, and Hope Bettilyon is the wife of Bernard L. 
Bettilyon. 
We will refer to Be-rnard L. as '' ~Ir. Bettilyon, '' 
and· Kenneth We-bb as • '~Ir. Webb'' hereinafter. 
To the writer this case had one astonishing asp~ect. 
One would naturally expect that the fighting which 
took place on the night in question was preceded by 
curses, great anger, abuse and name-calling. Noth-
ing of the kind took place. All the -witnesses_ 
agreed on that. 
At .about 9 :30 in the evening Mr. Bettilyon .and 
wife took the train to Saltair, ,danced two or three 
times, left the dance floor about 10:30 to 10 :45; 
before the 11 .o'clock intermission, met Mr. Webb 
and his wife, and all four went to the racer and 
stopped at point F, north of the \vest loading plat-
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form, where they stayed 15 or 20 minutes waiting 
·for a ride on the racer. They moved east. 'rhere 
are two tandems of cars operated on the west track. 
(Earl Cochran, Tr. 155 and 175-6). 
Mr. Bettilyon stated he would get the boys to start 
the cars on the east side. At point L he leaned on 
the fence and finally one of the boys looked over 
''and I asked him if they wouldn't start up the 
other line of cars, and he said s,omething to the 
effect that they "'Tould be starting up in a little 
"'hile and there was no use hurrying and that they 
\vould get it done eventually.'' ( Tr. 78). 
''They were very, very nice.'' ''I asked them some 
questions about the operating of the racer." ''We 
bantered back and forth. I made reference to the 
fact they were giving pretty lousy service, and they 
laughed back and asked me what business I was in, 
and did I always give good service.'' ''All very 
friendly, we were laughing back and forth.'' 
''Eventually I said something to the effect, well, 
since the~ didn't want our 1noney we had to take 
lit and give it to another concession, and one of the· 
boys whirled and said if I didn't like the -service 
I knew what I could do, and I said yes, I guess I 
knew w4at I could do. . . . he shouted to me . . . to 
get the hell out of there, something like that. . . . I 
believe I said 'Go jump in the· lake,' and then turn-
ed and started up to the north. . . . I was still 
squatted down." (Tr~ 78-80). 
''The fellow 'vho had made the remark was on plat-
form A and he leaped across these cars and got 
over here . . . and turned me: around and shoved 
me back. (He used) both hands. . . . I was taken 
eompletely off my feet and I immediately swung 
a.nd missed him. (He) simply flew right in and 
the next moment 've ''rere fighting for all we were 
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both worth. . . . Immediately he was joined by two 
other men from platform A . . . who started right 
in on me without any provocation, raining b~ows 
from every ang·le. . . . At point M three were on 
me. I wanted to get out of there. In fact I didn't 
want any trouble to start with. . . . I tried to ·get 
out, tried -going back up ; in fact I was being backed 
up (north all the time)." ((Tr. 80-2). 
''I know I was grabbed several times and 
held while other people hit me in the front 
and back and eventually I got down to about 
point 0, \Vhere I was knocked out." (Tr. 
83). 
Earl Cochran, the employe of app·ellantg who first 
talked to Mr. Bettilyon, testified that a "Slim'' 
Bernard Lynch, a friend of his who did not work 
there. too~ hold of !fir. Bettilyon from behind and 
took him over about to 0 and that Bettilyon 
wrenched loose and started to fight again and Jack 
(Lamp-ere) hit him. ''That is when I hit l\Ir. Webb. 
. . . After I hit him he was over here . . . between 
G and F, . . . out towards the center (of the en-
trance platfonn)." (Tr. 151-2). ·He further testi· 
fied that none of appellants' four employes got any 
black eyes or bruises, and that on the previous trial 
that ''There were a lot of them, I will tell you that; 
there was quite -a few swinging wild around there; · 
"I know we had to take them all." (Tr. 170). 
Further that Bettilyon was 'lvorking north up the 
platform toward the entrance and that he (Cochran) 
was not backing up. Further that on the previous 
trial he testifjed, ''I 'vent across there a.nd I grab-
bed his hands, like this" and that he was a little 
mad, (Tr. 171) although in this trial he testified 
that he never touched Mr. Bettilyon until Mr. Bet-
tilyon swung at him. (Tr. 148; Tr. 172). In the 
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previous trial Cochran testified Bettilyon said, 
"You come and put me over there," and he ~aid, 
"I will do just that." 
Mr. Bettilyon was never ordered to leave the con-
cession. Before Earl Cochran caine across the cars 
he told Mr. Bettilyon to go around to the other sidl! 
where the cars were running. 
Jack and John Lampere are brothers. John Lam-
pere testified that when Earl Cochran told Mr. 
Bettilyon to go around on the other side Mr. Bet-
tilyon said, '' ''1ly don't you put me around there >' 
and Earl s~aid, ·''I will do just that,'' .and ' 'my bro-
ther Jack started to go over there and I started to 
go over there, and my brother took and handed me 
his glasses." (Tr. 213). 
Then Lynch, an outsider and a friend of Earl's; 
''came into the fray.'' He ran in and grabbed Mr. 
Bettilyon. ( Tr. 213¥2). 
Jack Lampere testified to the s.ame effect and that 
he himself asked Mr. l3ettilyon to go a:f<ound to the 
other side. (1Tr. 235). He hit ~Ir. Bettilyon twice 
and then hit Mr. Webb. Then he knocked Mr. Bet-
tilyon down. (Tr. 236). · 
.Jack La.mpere said a hand came over his shoulder 
and hit him in the' face -and he turned around fast 
•'and hit someone and it turned out to be Mrs. 
Webb." (Tr. 237). 
Respondent testified that Mr. Bettilyon got up from 
his crouching position at L, he called something 
over· his shoulder and kept right on 'valking a'vay, 
and Cochran and the Lampere brothers were 
'' s'vinging at him and he wa.s s\vinging back, trying 
to back up.'' (Tr. 123). "And after he (Mr. Bet-
t ilyon) _ was knocked out . . . (these men) walked 
right over n1y brother and stnrt0d in, all of t.hem, 
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on my husbsnd. . . . One of them knocked him to 
his knees.'' ''I stepped . . . on~ or two steps and 
I slapped him (Jack Lampere) and he knocked me 
out." When I slapp·ed him "he was looking right 
at me.'' (Tr. 124-5 ). 
Mrs. Bettilyon testified as to what happened tQ 
her husband, Mr. Bettilyon that ''He was knocked 
out right flat on the floo,r, and the scuffle was go-
ing on all around him, and over him, and one of the 
fellows sort I of kicked him out of the way.'' And 
after Mr. ~·ettilyon went down, ''Well, they walked 
all over him and kicked him out of the way.'' 
"Then I saw Mr. Webb get knocked down to his 
knees.'' And ''Well, the operation was just like · 
that. Just as soon as Mr. Webb was knocked down 
Mrs. Webb was knocked out.'' 
And 
''\\nen Mr. Webb was knocked down, Mrs. 
"\\..,.ebb stepped out there and said 'You 
can't do that to my husband,' and she 
slapped Mr. Lampere, and he just pulled 
his arm back, and measured for a good one 
and let go." 
. t~nd when asked whether respondent was knocked 
in a sitting or prone flat position, 
''She ""'as p,rone; she was unconscious. She 
was just stretched out on the floor, un- · 
conscious, and Mr. Webb wa.s able to get to 
his feet and come over and lifted her up 
to a sitting position, and he was patting 
her cneeks, and that." (Tr. 94-6). 
Kenneth Webb testified that after the conversation 
between Bettilyon and Cochran ''He. (Bettilyon) 
got up and started to walk back to where we were.'' 
(He had been squatting down at L). ''I irnagine he 
bad taken ahout five steps, something like that, 
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ed over and turned him around, and gave him a 
push, and Lou (Mr. Be,ttilyon) kind of broke away, 
or gained his balance again, and swung back at 
this fellow, and when that happened there was a 
couple· of more fellows came up there and they all 
got hold_ of Lou and I didn't really know if they 
were pushing him, shoving him,-·or hitting him, but 
there were fists flying.'' 
''Mr. Bettilyon wa.s just trying to defend hin1self 
the best he could. '' ''I st~pped in between them, 
and said, 'Lis,ten, you gruys, cut tha.t out; \vhat is 
the idea of this, anyWay . Come on, Lou, let us 
get out of here.' I took hold of Lou's arn1, to turn 
him around, and at that time somebody swung a.t 
me, and I ba,cked up, and I might have hit back. 
I don't know; I don't even remember." (Tr. 105-6). 
And "We wanted to\ get out of there, and "re kept 
trying to get up here where \Ve could get out, and 
we got up to ·about this point in here \vhen Lou 
\vas knocked out." (Tr._ 108). 
So it clearly appears: 
1. That there \Vas no quarrel or harsh 
or profane language preceding the melee; 
2. That it cannot be said that it was a 
question for the jury as to who started the 
trouble. 
3. That ~fr. Bettilyon never was ordered 
off the premises, but only 'asked to g10 
around to· the west side of the ·loading 
platform. · 
4. That both Mr. Webb and Mr. Bettilyon 
( reRpondent 's husband . and brother) were 
down before she intervened, and that thev 
'vere. in dang-er. · 
fi. That no conduct on the pa.rt of Mr. Bet-
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tilyon justified the conduct of Cochran and 
the two Lamperes, and that Mr. Bettilyon 
was not at fault, and was not the 
aggressor. 
6. That no conduct on anybody's part jus-
tified the assault on respondent. 
7. That nir. Bettilyon started to leave the 
east platforll). before Earl Cochran came 
over the cars, and that he .was traveling 
towards the entrance at all times, and that 
C~ochran and the two Lamperes were fol-
lowing him right up from point L to beyond 
point 0 on the entrance platform. 
EXTENT OF RESPONDE~NT'S INJURIES 
MR. BETTILYON was knocked out and did not 
see respondent knocked down. 
MR. WEBB testified that prior to the evening of 
June 22d, at Saltair, his wife (respondent) w.a.s in 
very good health; that he worked late every night, 
~and that Mrs. Webb would cut the lawns and do the 
watering, the housework, etc., .and that she never 
complained to him of any illness o-r inability to do 
her work. (Tr. 111-12), and further: 
Q. Now, 'vhat has been her physical con-
dition, as you have observed, since June 
22d, how has she been around the house T 
A. Well, after that time she got up Sun-
day morning, when we got up, and was com-
plaining about an awful beadache, and we 
thoue~ht it ""'as just a natural reaction, and 
never paid much .attention to it. That 
went on for a couple of weeks, and she had 
nPVPr complained very much, but she al-
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ways complained of a backache and head-
ache, and often she would really have to 
go lie down. It would get her to where 
she couldn't stand up any longer and it 
\vas about that time that \Ve had to call the 
girls in from upstairs, to come down and 
do some of the housework, and cook the 
meals, because my wife would try, hut s.he 
couldn't keep up that long to do it, and she 
just went down in health, started going 
down from that time on, and I really didn't 
know very much about what was wrong, 
but I wanted her to go to the doctor 
Q. Just tell us, has she been able to per-
forln her hous.ehold duties as you described 
them prior to June 22d with as much effi-
. ciency since that date in your ho1ne up to 
the present time 1 . 
A. No. she has not. 
Q. Is she entirely well yet, as far as you 
know? 
A. No, she isn '( (Tr. 112-113). 
MR.S. WEiBB tesJified that she had missed her 
monthly period a little over two weeks before the 
night in question, and that the morning after she 
was knocked down :at Saltair that her neck and faep. 
were .aU swollen up·, she was black and blue, her 
back hurt 1to even move, 'and she had awful p~ains 
in her abdomen, and severe headaches, and wa.A 
nervous. The swelling in her face .and neck stayecl 
three or four days, and the 'headaches were like a 
pressure right around her head; it hurt worse t.o 
He do"\\rn than to stand up, and that she 'vas just 
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getting" back to normal so tha.t she could go to bed 
and sleep on January 30, 1941, a little- over six 
months after the occurrence a.t ·Saltair. 
Six days after she was knoeked down, she started 
to hemorrhage, and hemorrhaged continuously up 
to the 1st of January, 1941, she was so bad she could 
not put her feet to the floor and the emissions were 
large blood clots. CTr. 128-9). That these ·hem-
orrhages would last for eight or·ten days or longer, 
and then cut down just a little bit, b:ut they never 
stopped. She did not consult a doctor until Octo-
ber, 1940, when she consulted Dr. J. U. Giesy, and 
he gave her electrical treatments every other day 
up to the time of trial in January, 1941. She was 
not able at the time of the trial to do all the work 
and things about the house she used to do. (Tr 
129.-30). 
On cross-examination res.pondent said she did not 
learn of her condition until some time in November, 
and that her doctor did not tell her anythin.g at 
first, and that after she finally got· her doctor's 
opinion, she went to her. attorney, and he said· ·he 
would not make a new complaint until he had tallrP-d 
to the doctor. She talked to her attorney some. 
time in November. (Tr. 138-9). 
DR. J. U. GIESIY, a physician and surgeon, testi-
fied that he examined respondent on October 2, 
1940. and found her to be in a_ weakened physical 
condition, an anemic condition, and somewhat in a-
nervous condition; he found a large, congested, 
and disp~laced uterus, the mouth of the uterus he 
found n1ore open than normal,. and tender through 
the pelvic region ; he further testified as follows : 
Q. From that examination of the uteru~ 
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could you tell whether .or not there had been 
any loss of blood J~ • 
A. 1 could do so, for the simple reason 
that loss of blood was manifested by the 
blood conditions indicating loss of blood, 
and by the fact that there was oozing of 
blood still continuing .. 
Q. Doctor, assuming that the plaintiff in this case 
had passed her regular menstrual period by about 
two weeks, and that on June 22·, 1940, she was struck 
1a blow of sufficient force to cause her to sit down 
violently, or to fall down on her back, and that some 
five or six days thereafter she suffered a severe 
vaginal hemorrhage, accompanied by large and 
numerous blood clots, and that she thereafter so 
suffered and continued to suffer hemorrhages and 
blood flow and clots for ten days or two weeks 
thereafter1 and that after that she continued to 
hemorrhage up until approxhnately January 1, 
1941: Taking all of these facts, as I have just given 
them to you, together with your personal diagnosis 
and examination of the patient on o.ctober 22nd, to-
gether with )'iOur personal knowledge· and exper-
ience in the field of medicine, what is your profes-
sional opinion as to whether or not on June 22, 1940, 
Mrs. W P.bb was or 'vas not pre·~ant ~ 
MR. JTJDD: We· object to that as incompetent 
and immaterial to the issues of this case, and that 
the facts. are not sufficiently stated to warrant a 
conr.lusion : warrant the (doctor in finding the con-
clusion. th.at is necessary. 
THE COURT: In what resp,ect are they deficient? 
MR .• JlTDD: In that we think from those fa.cts he 
~annort determine that. she "ra~ pre~nant. 
THE COUR,T: He may he, of course, of a differ-
0nt opinion. 
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MR. JUDD : vV ell, I am making my record, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
A. Will Y<>'u state the question briefly 
Q. The question is, taking all the facts as 
I have recited them to you, together with 
your personal diagnosis and examination of 
the plaintiff on October 22, 1940, tog1ether 
with your personal kn-o,vledge of and ex-
perience in medicine, what is your profes-
sional opinion, as a doctor, as to whether 
or not on June 22, 1940, Mrs. Webb was or 
was not pregnant~ 
MR. JlTDD: May our objection stand to the ques-
tion as re-stated, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes; and overruled. 
A. In my professional opinion Mrs. Webb 
""as pregnant on the 22ri.d of June, 1940. 
Q. Doctor, if in your op·inion as you have 
just stated it, that on June 22nd the plain-
tiff was pregnant, would, in your profes-
sional opinion, would a blow sufficiently 
violent to propel her to the floor be suffi-
cient to cause her ·a miscarriage? 
~fR. JUDD: I object to that .as incompetent and 
immaterial, and not sufficiently stating the facts . 
to warrant the conclusion called for. 
THE COURT: The objeetion is overruled. An-
~wer. 
A. In my opinion, yes. 
Q. Doctor, would the injuries described 
hy any such patient to you on O·ctober 2:?, 
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1940, coupled with your personal examina-
tion of her, which occurred on that san1e 
date, I ask you:~ would the injuries describ-
ed by her on the evening of June 22, 1940, 
coup,led with y;our examination and your 
diagnosis be sufficient to cause a mis-
carriage~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Doctor, if in your medical opinion that 
patient, the plaintiff herein, was pregnant 
on June 22, 1940, would a severe hem-
orrha,ge and issuance o.f blood five or six 
days thereafter, continuing for a period of 
ten days or two weeks thereafter con-
stitute a miscarriage - taking the facts as 
I have related them to you in the first 
hypothetical question I asked you, and 
assuming she had missed her menstrual 
period for two weeks prior~ 
A. Answering the a.ssun1ption that Mrs .. 
Webb 'vas pregnant on the 22nd of June, 
1940, the answer would be ''Yes.'' 
Q. Doctor, assuming that the plaintiff in 
this ease, Mrs. Webb, was pregnant and in 
a normal state of health on June 22, 1940, 
hut assuming that on that date she was 
struck a blow of sufficient violence to cause 
her to sit down vioJently, or to £all p·rone 
on her hack, and having your opinion that 
t h P fact~ just related might be sufficient 
to ~ause a vaginal hemorrhage, I ask you, 
i~ it your pr.orfessional op~inion that I said 
hemorrha~e, vaginal hemorrhage, might 
r.ontinue for a period of four or five months 
nftPr the da,te on which the blow was struck 
nnd wi~h lesser intensity, or would that 
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hemorrhage continue, ·might that hem-
orrhage continue at intervals 1 
A. Under the hypothetical assumption 
then, hemorrhage in such a case which had 
resulted in a ·miscarriage might continue, 
more probably, through a period of months 
at intervals after the initial hemorrhage 
following or accompanying the direct mis-
carnage. 
Q. Now, during this period of time you 
pave seen her, did your personal examina-
tion of her on those occasions from Octobe·r 
22nd to about the Christmas holidays re-
veal. to you that she was still suffering 
hemorrhages¥ · 
A. At interv~als, ~Ir. Brady. 
Q. What has her condition been the !last 
two times you have seen her these last two 
months, her physical condition? 
A. Between December and January she 
had quite a definite hemorrhage. Since 
then there has beep no pronounced or vis-
ible bleeding, as far as I have any informa-
tion on the subject. 
Q. That hemorrhage condition you speak 
of occurred as late as the Christmas holi-
days? 
A. Somewhat later. 
Q. What is her condition today, or as of . 
the last time you exa,mined her? 
A. There is an improvement. 
Q. Would you sav that she is now a well, 
healthy woman T 
A. No. 
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Q. How much time do you anticipate with 
the treatment y;ou are giving_ her, it will 
take before she is once again a. ,normal, 
healthy woman~ 
A. Frankly, Mr. Brady, I imag·ine the 
active local treatments. are about ended. It 
may take a little time to return her phys-
ical tone. 
Q. Would that be by natural processes or 
by medicinal processes~ 
A. Well, it would be largely by natura.! 
proeess~es. Some of it might be due to some 
medicinal treatment, if it v\"as found advis-
abl~. 
Q. N O\V, one further question. You 
spoke about the displacement of the uterus. 
Would you explain that a little more in de-
tail to the jury, what you found, and "rhat 
your opinion is as to what caused that dis-
placement, and how it \vas dispJaced ~ 
A. Well, there are several types of dis-
placement of the 11terus. In this particular 
cas.e the uterus was, as \Ve say retroverted, 
that is, tipped back. It \Vasn 't bent, whicl1 
me.ans it \Vould he a retroflexion. It was 
tipped definitely backwards, or retro-
verted. In my opinion, that retroversion 
has been cause4 by a uterus ·\vhich had suf-
fered, and- well, suffered from the effects 
of what I had already found to be a mis-
carriage, and had never returned to normal 
sjze, a condition in medicine that is known 
as a uterus which has become enlarged for 
~om~ rea.Ron or other, and has not returned 
to its normal size, in which there ""as a 
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~\Yollen, enlarged condition of the uterine 
organ. An organ of that kind somewhat 
enl~rged and ~onle\vhat ove·r weighted so 
that its s\vollen condition may easily, upon 
sudden or sharp exertion or lifting, or any-
thing of that kind, become disp~laced, and 
generally it "Till displace backwards .. 
Q. Could that dispJaeement, as you have 
described it to the court and jury, be caused 
in itself by an applic;ation of superior 
force, is that a medical possibility' 
A. Oh, there is a medical possibility of 
the uterus being displaced backwards, and 
some othe·r direction, by certain motions of 
force, yes. 
Q. Doctor, in your medical op~nion, would 
thP misearriage .and hemorrhages which 
you have described have any effect on th€\ 
patient's nervous system~ 
A. You see, in my opinion, in this par-
ticular case this displacement of the uterus 
followed probably a miscarriage, and was 
more due to the miscarriage than it was to 
anything else - now, any shock or violenc«' 
such as \Yas narrated to me in this case, I 
having no personal knowledge of it, except 
hears.ay~ as regards the actual incident 
which occurred, any severe shock of th.at 
kind will have· a more or less unbalancing 
effect on a p.erson 's nervous system, I be-
lieve. In other words, any gudden shock, 
any sudden injury, I think medical author-
ity will sustain me in stating1 that it always 
results in what we call a nervous shock, 
in a grenter .or less degree. 
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DR. E. L. SKIDM:ORE,_ a physician and surgeon 
produc.ed as a witness by .appellants, testified that 
pregnancy and miscarriage might account for re-
spondent's physical troubles (Tr. 201); he made no 
physical examination of her (Tr. 203). 
He furthe:r testified as follows · 
Q. Assuming that on the evening in ques-
tion, on the 22nd of .June, 1940, l\lrs. VV ebb 
was struck a blow by the fist of a man, and 
she was propelled violently to the floor at 
the plaee she was standing, and was knock-
ed wholly unconscious for some consi~er­
able period of time, that later she 'vas re-
vived and escorted to her automobile, with 
help, and that she went home, and five or 
six da.ys thereafter she hs.d nausea in the 
stomach; she had severe harkaches; the 
side of her £ace was swollen and bruised; 
she suffered severe headaches, and five or 
six vaginal hemorrhages, accompanied by 
large clots of blood, ·for ten or fourteen 
days there.after: Would that state of facts, 
Doctor, enable you to venture .an opinion 
as to whether or not this hemorrhage, these 
hemorrhages that she- suffered were as a re-
sPlt. of the h1o,vR inflicted upon her' 
1\fR. JUDD: I object to that, your Honor, as in-
competent and immaterial, a statement of fact, in-
cluding a number of facts which are not in evidence. 
THE COURT: For instanc.e, point out the spe-
tific facts. 
MR,. JlTDD: 'Vell, that she was - I don't know, 
there were so many .- if you can read it, I will 
tpoint out. There were so many words used there 
aR a. speech that were not in ller tr-stimony at all. 
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MR. BRAD,iY: It is a statement of f,act, and no 
speech was intended. You have made a challenge 
that 'Ye haven't put the facts in. 
MR. JUDD: ''Violently to the floor,'' there is. no 
evidence· of that. There is no evidence she was 
knocked wholly unconscious for some considerable 
time. That is absolutely false, because her husband 
said he went to her and he s.at her up and patted 
her cheeks and she came' to, and he lifted her up 
and took her over onto a bench. 
MR. BRADY: Your own witness testified he saw 
them go down underneath the pavilion and she was 
escorted down there. 
MR .. JUDD: I have made my objection, and point-
ed out, and I can continue to point out. 
THE COURT: The objection may be overruled. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Yes what' 
A. That is the .answer 
Q. From those facts you would s,ay she 
might have been p~re·gnant ~ 
_A. Yes .. 
Q. And might have had a miscarriage.~ 
A. Possibly. 
'ARGUMENT 
APPELLANTS' THEORY 
Counsel reiterates on page 22 of appellants' brief 
the statement that the appellee and her· party at 
the time of the altercation, or subs,equent thereto, 
never had offered to pay or p.aid the required fee 
for a ride .on the racer. As clearly appears from 
the record, r~ference to which is made in our StatP-
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ment of Facts earlier in this brief, no fee is paid to 
ride on the racer until the passenger is seated in a 
car and the bar placed in front of the seat. where-
upon the emp:loyes collecrt just hefoTe the ca.r is dis-
patched over the Tacer. This statement is manifest-
ly unfair and misleading. They further state on 
the same page that lVIr. Bettilyon was the leader of 
the party and that "following his approximately 
four hours at a highball convention in the N e"\vhouse 
Hotel that he was. at Saltair to do foolish and un-
called-for things for the amusement of his party; 
that in going down on the east side he was at a 
point where he had no right to be." 
It appears from the evidence that he had been at a 
20-30 Club convention at the Newhouse Hotel from 
3 :30 to about 7 :30 p. m., and that he had had six or 
seven cocktails at the most during that period of 
time, that after the convention was over he drove 
his car home, with a friend as a passenger, had 
supper and left the house and proceeded to go to 
the depot and then to Saltair, and that they l1ad 
nothing to dri~..k after the convention. (.Tr. 72-4). 
Here agnin we ha:ve counsel s·aying th~t he was at 
Saltair to do foolish and uncalled-for things for 
the amusement of his party, an ob¥iously unfair 
and unjustified statement. 
It clearly appears from the dra-\ving and from the 
testimony that there were two platforms for pas-
sengers at the giant racer. Counsel states that Mr. 
Bettilyon was at a point where he had no right to 
he, and that app·ellants' ''boys,'' after several times 
inviting him to leave, were fully within their rightR 
in going over to him to try to induce him to go 
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around "There he would not eause them trouble in 
the operation of the racer . 
. 
Of course, the racer was a resort concession and 
soliciting the public to patronize it, and the public 
\Yas invited to come upon the raceT 's concession and 
ride the cars on the ra.cer. Counsel say that for 
him to be where he was ''created a consta.nt hazard 
to the safety of the racer operation because it 
diverted the attention of the boys from their work; 
that when they invited him to leave and he did not, 
he became a trespasser and was subject to re-
movaL'' 
The evidence shows that Mr. Bettilyon never was 
invited or asked to leave the concession, that every-
thing was pleasant and agreeable until he said they 
apparently did n.ort want his money, and they would 
spend it on some other con.cession, whereupon Earl 
<Jochran and the others went into action for thP 
purpose stated by Earl c·ochran as hereinbefore set 
forth of ''taking them.'' lT nder all the evidence, 
all that Cochran ever did was to a,sk Bettilyon to go 
over to the otheir side where the cars "\Vere then run-
ning_ and never to leave the concession. I wonder 
what counsel thinks Mr. Be~ttilyon should have done 
,vhen ~Ir. Cochran, after saying, "I will do just 
that,'' came leaping over the course on the east side 
'in pursuit of Mr. Bettilyon, who was w.alking back 
to the entrance~ When respondent slapped Jack 
Lampere, her brother wa.s knocked out, lying- on 
the floor, and, as she testified, "ras being kicked out 
of. the way, and her husband hRd been knocked to 
his knees. It seems p·erfectly clear that the alarm 
Rhe said she felt as to. their danger 'vas natural and 
~nstiffpif. 
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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR HA VlNG TO DO 
WITH PREGNANCY AND MISQARRIAGE 
On p·age 24 of their brief, eounsel take up assign-
ments of error Nos. 1 and 2, the first being an oh-
jection as to the question asked respondent as. to 
whether she could tell the court whether or not she 
was pregnant on the evening· in question. Of course, 
·she was not competent to testify to that fact. She 
did not testify to the fact either one way or the 
other. In response to the question she said, ''I 
had , missed my p·eriod before, mornthly period, a 
little over two weeks. '' So that the ruling of the 
court, overruling the objection, was entirely harm-
less. And, of course, the motion to strike .her an-
swer above set forth was, properly denied. 
We have no quarrel with the statement that the 
question of whether or not she was pregnant is one 
of science and must be determined by the testimony 
of skilled, professional persons. In the second 
Oklahoma ease cited by appellants, the two physi-
cians who testifie.d on behalf of plaintiff testified 
against her, and the court p·rop·erly held that to 
sustain her theory that the distention of. her bladder 
caus.ed the stitches to tear, and that the tearing of 
the stitches caused the bladder to fall. was unten-
able unless she had competent medical testimony to 
support it. In the third Oklahoma case cited by 
couns.el, the o"nly evidenc;e in behalf of the claimant 
was his testimony that he was gassed and that that 
cauRed his disability. No skilled '\\itnes.s support-
ed that claim. 
A.S TO PREGNANCY AND MISCA~RIAGE 
Rtarting on na.~e 27 0f' their brief, appellants assert 
that re-spondent failed to produce eVidence tending 
to support her claim that as a result of. the injuries 
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inflicted upon her by the assault and battery that 
she suffered a miscarriage and lost her unborn 
child. Appellants requested the court to instruct 
the jury that there was no substantial evidence that 
respondent was pregnant at the time of the alleged 
assault and battery. 
\"\T e have set out heretofore the testimony of Dr. 
Giesy produced by respondent, and Dr. Skidmore·, 
produced by appellants, and it seems clea.r that 
under their evidence there was ample testimony to 
justify the submitting of the question of whether 
respondent suffered a miscarriage to the jury. Dr. 
Giesy test~fied positively as hereinbefore set forth 
under the heading, ''Extent of Respo'ndent 's In-
juries," that in his opinion respondent was preg-
nant at the time of the assault and battery, and Dr. 
Skidmore stated that he could not say that she was 
not. Dr. Giesy, of course, was in a position to give 
a competent opinion because of his knowledge of 
her condition and his examination -and treatment 
of her, and the condition of her pe~lvic region. B·oth 
doctors testified that a blow sufficiently violent to 
propel respondent to- the floor would be sufficient 
to cause a miscarriage. 
In the Louisiana case., cited on pag~e 29 of ap·pel· 
]ants' brief, the court s-aid that it was not in the 
slightest deg1ree convinced that the '' sligfut accit 
dent'' described had anything to do with the abor-
tion in question, and that in a matter of serious im-
port to itself the court would not act on it. The 
court's belief as to the facts in a ]a,v suit have no 
place in a case in Utah. Louis.iana is a civil law 
State. A judge in Utah 'vould l1ave no power to 
~n bstitute his . opinion as to what the Pvidence 
~bowed for the opinion ()f competent medical P.X-
'PP.rts. In the seeond T_joui.~iana ea~e ritPo on page 
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32 by appellants, it appeared that one doctor s.aid 
he did not know whether the trouble suffered by 
the claimant could possibly have 'been caused by a 
blow and that he would not know whether it was a 
probability in the case, and that the other doctor 
'rho had treated claimant for two and one-half years 
gave no opinion 
In the Kentucky case cited by appellants on page 33, 
the Court held that they could not agree with the 
contention that the miscarriage was not shown to 
have been the direct result of the collision. 
In the Michigan case cited· on pag:e 35, the Court 
stated that the evidence .did not disclose evidentiary 
facts, and that the exp•ert had but a theory that plain-
tiff was sterile becaus.e she did not become preg-
n.ant, and that probative evidence must be sorne-
thing more tangib~e than a me~e pyramiding of 
theories. In the instant case) there is positive tes-
timony by Dr. Giesy that in his opinion respondent 
·was preg1nant at the time of the blow and that a 
miscarriage resulted from the blow. 
In the Maryland case cited on page 35, the Court 
said: 
''The plaintiff has failed in this ease to 
meet this burden of proof. The testimony 
of the doctor, whom she called, is clearly 
to the effect that there is no natural and 
reas,.onable con11ection het\veen the accident 
of February 12~ and the plaintiff's illness 
and operation of July 3. Nor is this con-
nection sho"rn by any other testimony on 
the record. Conjecture, speculation, or 
1nere possibility, must not usurp the place 
of proof of the Pssential facts in issue if 
the trial of facts is to remain a rational and 
1usf prnrrilure. '' 
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.A.SSIGNMENTS 0'1~' ERROR BASED ON AD-
nllSSION OF EVIDENCE UNDE·R CROS:S-
EX.A.I\fiNATION 
The question was as follows: 
'' N o"T, you have described those dutie1s you 
have in connection with the collection of 
fares. Is acting as a bouncer for the ejec-
tion or eviction of people that you think 
should be evicted, also a p.art of your 
duties~" (Tr. 160). 
On pag"e 38 of appellants' brief, counsel say: 
''This statement, first, is an op·en attemp~t 
on the p·art of counsel to embarrass ·the 
witness befo.re the jury in that counsel 
injects into the picture a rough situation 
such as a bar-room or the like, where the 
'bouncer' is a required pa,rt of the equip-
n1ent. 
''Second. it assumes that appellants main-
tained such a place and that a 'bouncer' 
"'"as necessary and that this boy was of 
such a character, that he would act as a 
bouncer. 
''Third, the statement assumes that as 
such 'bouncer' he could eject or evict peo-
ple whom he thought ought to be thrown 
out regardless of who they were or what 
they were doing. j 
''There 'va.s no evidence in the record 
which would warranf any inferenee that 
app·ellants employed anyone to act as 
bouncer in and about the giant racer, and 
particularly that this witness was employ-
ed for any such purpose. Neither iR thPre 
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anything in the record that the appellants 
employed anyone to eject or evict people 
that they 'think should be evicted,' or that 
this particular witness was so employed. 
The record shows upon its face that the 
sole and only reason for asking this ques-
tion was to prejudice the mind of the jury 
against the app.ellants.'' 
First, let us see. what the· witness thought about y· 
vrhen he was permitted to answe·r the ques,tion: 
A. I don't suppose so. If they don't -
'vell, if. they don't go we ha.ve - it was 
ne·ver told us to do it, hut we supposed we 
always had to. (Tr. 160) . 
.In the 1928 edition of Funk & W agnail's New 
Standard Dietionary of the English Language, on 
page 317, we find the following definition: 
"Bouncer . . . ( 5) (Slang, U. S.). A per-
son employed to eject disorderly pe~rsons, 
as from a hotel or restaurant." 
So, there is no question but the word "bouncer," 
is a recognized term in __ ..\.merican nomenclature, 
and it is clearly apparent from the· answer of the 
.. witness that the witness thoroughly understood it, 
and that he did act a.s a bouncer. · 
' 
The argument of counsel really js. ridiculous. The 
witness had stated his duties at the request of 
counsel for app·ella.nts, and he· went on properly 
enough and testified that acting as a bouncer he 
~upposed was a part of such duties. 
Counsel say that . the record shows upon its face 
that the sole and only reason for asking this ques-
tion was to prejudice the mind of the jury against 
appellants. The thing that decided the jury against 
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the appellants 'Yas the rough and uncouth antics 
of appellants' employes on the night in question. 
Pursuing the absurdity further, we might ask when 
is a bouncer not a bouncer~ And the answer would 
be, that whe·n employes whose duty it is to se~at 
passengers at a public concession in cars, fasten 
them in, and collect fares, leave their plac.e of em-
ployment and abandon their duties in order to go 
out and start a roug~h house among the passengers 
"Taiting to patronize the concession. The cases 
cited by appellants are clearly not in point. 
In the Idaho case, a question was asked a witness 
implying that suits "rere instituted against the hus-
band of the respondent in that case, because of his 
financial condition and her extravagance. The 
Court said that there was no evidenee on which to 
base any such ~assumption as the question did. 
In the Maryland case, the court ·refused to permit 
a witness to be asked on cross-examination if he did 
not live at his mother's home with the woman he 
married, before he married her. The Court held 
that such testimony was entirely collateral, and did 
11ot bear in any way on the c.redihility of the wit-
ness, and could have no purpose save to degrade 
and humiliate him. 
J n the Indiana cas.e, the objection to a quP-stion was 
sustained on the ground that it assumed facts not 
covered by the direct testimony of the witness. The 
Court held that the ques.tion assumed facts as to 
\vhich there was no evidence. 
On pag1e 41 of their brief, appellants say that the 
question asked Mr. Cochran, and above .quoted, 
assumed that there was s.ome duty upon the appel-
lants which did not exist either as a matter of law 
or as shown by the facts. Counsel i~ore the fact 
that tl1e witness had testified to the fact HR _to his 
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duties upon their examination, and that the ques-
tion to which they object merely sought to elicit 
information as to whether or not there were addi-
tional dutie,s. 
The Alabama case cited on page 41 involved a 
question asked a witness who was in a car but not 
driving it whether he knew, a.s a driver of a car, 
that it was his duty to keep to the right when turn-
ing a corner, and the court held that the question 
assumed· the existence of a duty not prescribed by 
statute nor ordinance. On page 42 of their brief, 
counsel for appellants arg)ue their objections to the 
·hypothetical questions propounded to Drs. Giesy 
and Skidmore on the gTound that the questions con-
tain .s,tatements . of fact which were not supported. 
by the evidenc'e and that the facts \\7ere colored and 
exaggerated to the extent that they were mis-
1 d . 
.. ea 1ng. 
Under _the heading· hereinbefore of ''Extent of Re-
spondent's Injuries,'' we have set forth the ques-
tions, as well as all of the evidence, with res,pect to 
respondent's condition, and in the "Statement of 
Facts'' at the start of this brief, we have set forth 
the testimony with respect to the assault and bat-
tery, and it clearly appears that competent evi-
dence was adduced justifying every element in-
cluded in the questions to which appellants object. 
If it was an exaggeration of the evidence to include 
in the hypothetical questions that respondent was 
struck a blow of sufficient force to cause her to sit 
down violently, or that she was propelled violently 
to the floor, we certainly must confess an .ignorance 
of what violently meanR. 
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ASSIGNlVIENTS OF ERRO·R BASED UPON 
REFUSAL TO GIVE APPELLANTS' RE-
QUESTED INSTRUOTIONS. 
Be~nning on page 43. of their brief, appellants dis-
cuss the failure of the court to give the instructions 
requested by then1. 
R.equest No. 3 in effect would, if given, have sub-
mitted to the jury the question of whether or not 
Jack Lampere used unnecessary force in knocking 
respondent down, and would have instructed the 
jury in the first sentence thereof that the plaintiff 
(respondent here) attacked him, and that he was 
protecting himself, and would only leave ·to the 
jury the question of whether or not he exercised his 
judgment unreason~ably ''in his own defense.'' 
There 'vas a dispute in the evidence. Respondent 
testified that Lampere was looking directly at her 
\Vhen she slapp:ed him, and that he then struck her 
and knocked her out. Lampere wa.s the only wit-
ness who testified that his back was turned and that 
respondent struck him from behind, and that he 
iurned around and struck before he kne'v that it 
was a woman who had slapped him. This requested 
instruction assumes as a fact that Lampere was at-
tacked by re·spondent. and v\ra.s defending himself 
and th·a.t the slap administered to him by respond-
ent was unjustified. · 
From. our Statement of Facts heretofore in this 
brief, this Court 'vill observe tha.t respondent testi-
fied that Jack Lamper~ knocked her brother out, 
and that (these men) walked right o:ver him and 
started in on her husband, and one of them. knocked 
him to his knees and that she stepped onP or two 
steps and slapped Jack I~a.mpere, and hP knocked 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
Jler out, and that when she slapperd him he was look .. 
ing right at her. (Tr. 124-5). 
The instruction requested is erroneous in assuming 
a disputed question of fact as a fact, in assuming 
that Jack I.Jampere was in the right, when . he 
knocked respondent's {brother out and knocked her 
husband to his knees just before he excha~ged 
blows with respondent, (which he testified he did), 
and that Mr. Bettilyon wa.s in the wrong, because· if 
Jvlr. Bettilyon was in the right, of course' respond.;. 
ent had a right to intervene when· he was knocked 
down and her hushand was knocked to his knees. 
Ther~ can be no question but that she was justified 
in intervening to prevent more injuries to her hus~ 
band or her brother, or both. She testified that 
they 'vere kicking her; brother out of the way to 
carry on the fight. · 
The same is true as to Requests Nos. 4 ·and 6. 
As stated in the closing of the Statement. of Facts 
hereinbefore, it clearly ·appe.ars from the evidence 
that no conduct on the part of Mr. Bettilyon justi• 
fied 'the conduct of Cochran and the two Lampe res, 
.and that Mr. Bettilyon was not at fault, and wa.~ not 
the ag1gressor) and that Mr. Bettilyon started to· 
]eave the east platform before E-arl Cochran came 
ove·r the cars with the avowed purpose of putting 
Bettilyon over on· the west platform, .and that Mr.· 
Rettilyon was travelling north toward the entrance 
~at all times, and that Cochran and the two Lamperes 
'vere follo,ving him right up from point L to beyond· 
point 0 Qn the di~gram on page 3 of appellants' 
hrief, and that no conduct on anybody's part justi-
fjed .Tack I_jampere's assault on respondent, so that 
neither of the requested instructions were pertinent 
to the is.sues of the case. 
On p.ag.e. 47 of their brief, appellants request the 
!lonrt, jn their R.eqneRt No. 5, to instruct that Bet-
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racer platform when only the west side was being 
operated, and that appellants' se,rvants ''in their 
operation of the racer had a lawful right to use such 
reasonable force as was necessary after request-
ing Bernard L. Bettilyon to leave that part of de-
fendants' property, to remove him from the place 
in question,'' and that '' if in using force to remove 
said Bernard L. Bettilyon that he attempted to or 
did start to fight or hit the servant or servants of 
defendants and as a result of such assault or at-
tempted assault the said Bernard L. Bettilyon was 
later injured, and that thereafter this plaintiff's 
husband voluntarily came into the fight and that 
later this plaintiff herself left a place of safety and 
slapped defendants' employe1e in the face, as a re-
sult of which plaintiff was struck by said employee, 
then plaintiff cannot recover in this case and your 
verdict will be for the defendants,, and each of them, 
'no cause of action'. '' 
Counsel state ·that the.1requested instruction cleaJ" .. 
ly states their theory of the case. The reason the 
requeRted instruction was not given was that the 
theory is untenable. Appellants were operating a 
public concession at a resort. The entrance and 
hoth the east and west platforms were thrown open 
to thn public. Counsel assumes that regardless of 
the invitation to the public and the fact that re· 
spondent and her companions were at the racer to 
patroniz(:l! it, that because Bettilyon went over on 
the east platform and asked to have the cars on the 
east side started in operation so as to take care of 
the crowd 'that appellants' employes harl the right 
to order him to the west platform and to uRe force 
to remove him to the west platform and to over-
(~ome any resistance to their manhandli11g that RPt 
tilyon put forth. 
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'rhere are no cases in the books 'vhich justify such 
conduct on the part of employes at a public conces .. 
sion which the public is invited to ·visit, so how can 
appellants p~roperly say that Bettilyon was in the 
wrong, and' that therefore respondent has no rem-
edy~ And certainly, under the evidence of re ... 
spondent that her brother was knocked out and that 
her husband was knocked to hia knees, and that 
these employes were kicking her brother out- of the 
way, it cannot be said that there was not -sufficient 
justification for her interference! Bear in mind-
that respondent's husband was trying to stop the 
employes of appellants from further attacking 
Bettilyon, and trying' to assist him in getting away. 
Counsel, of course, take the position that there was 
evidence that Bettilyon was in the wrong, and also 
that respondent had no right to inte~rvene. 
The cases cited by appellants are not in point, as 
the facts in this c-ase do not justify the submission 
of any such issue as s.aid requested instructions 
would have injected into the case. 
On page 51· of their brief, in Requested Instruction 
No. 7, appellants requested the court to charge· the 
jury that Bettilyon had no right to he on the east 
platform, and that if he refused to leave the east 
side when requested hy appellants' servants, in ef ... 
feet that the·y had the rig1ht to use any reasonable 
force that was necessary to remove him, and that 
Bettilyon had no right to resist. In other words, 
they ask the court to instruct the jury that Bettil-
yon was a trespasser after he was asked to go to 
the west platform and did not do so, and that the 
enRujng as~.anlts by appellants' em-ployes on Bettil-
yon, on Webb and on respondent were perfectly 
-proper. 
\Vhere did the right of these b·ouncers originate! 
What gave them any. authority or right to man-
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handle and bea.t up people who came to the racer 
concession at the invitation of appellants? 
On page 52, in Requested Instruction No. 8, appel-
lants asked the court to instruct the jury that the 
owner of the premises ''may rightfully restrict the 
use of his premises to his business guests . . . '' 
and that ''if a business gues.t refus.es to quit a re~ 
stricted portion of the premises after verbal request 
so to do and reasonable opportunity has been given 
him to depart, he ther6by beco.mes ·a trespasser and 
may be ejected by the use of such reasonable force 
a_s is necessary under the circumstances." 
And counsel quote authority to the effect that 
reasonable force ntay be used to prevent' a trespass 
or to eject a trespasser or intruder. 
iCounsel cites on page 53 a Utah case holding that 
ihe occupant of pemises has the legal right to ad-
Init whom he pleases and to exp'e'l anyone who 
abuses the privilege thus given him. The case doe-s 
hold that one who abuses the privilege and is asked 
to depart and fails to do s.o becomes a trespasser, 
.and the o'vner is justified in using reasonable force 
to eject him. There was no order for Bettilyon to 
leave ·the premises by anyone. He had abused no 
privilege, and all the evidence is to the effect that 
because he failed to heed the capricious orders of 
appellants' bounce·rs to .f}'O to another part of their 
premises, they had the right to forcibly eject him. 
As heretofore stated~ th{ltre is. no authority, in our 
opinion, which supports counsel's contention. 
On page 54 of their brief, appellants theorize tha.t 
before respondent intervened in defense of her bro-
ther and husband, the fracas had come to an end. 
They. call attention to the fact that one Bernard 
(Slim) I.Jynch,· not. a.n e·mploye orf appellants and an 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
34 
outsider, grabbed Bettilyon by the arms and told 
him ''that he had better get out'' and that he, 
Lynch, proceeded to edect him and that Bettilyon 
got loose. 
Can there be any question but what this was mere-
ly a continuation of the unjustified conduct of app·el-
lants' employes in attempting to move Bettilyon 
from one platform to the other~ Can it be said 
when the evidence shows by the testimony of appel-
lants' own witnesses ~hat Bettilyon was constantly 
moving north toward the entrance, and that Coch-
ran and the Lamp·ere brothers were constantly fol-
lowing him up while he \vas backing and travelling 
north and trying, not as counsel would have you 
:believe to move him to the west platform, but to 
beat him up and brutalize him, that Bettilyon was 
the aggressor at any time~ He was properly re-
sisting a manhandling by Cochran to begin with, 
and trying to prevent being beat up by Cochran 
and the Lampe~re brothers from then 01;1. If em-
ployes of a concession, inviting1 the public to· patron-
ize if and visit it, can justify conduct such as there 
was on the night in question, we had better have a 
.new set of la,vs to protect the public from thugs 
·employed by concessio111 owners, because a ruling 
that their conduct on the n_ight in question meets 
with the approv;al of the law would prQhably pre-
cipitate an era of assaults by con.cession e1nployes 
~ho could find any excuse to demonstrate their 
fistic and roughhouse ability on concession patrons. 
In this conn~ction, this Court \vill observe from 
the evidence that ·an three of appellants' employes 
--.vere big, strong fellows, any one of them superior 
in size and build to 1\f r. Betti lyon; and that while 
B·ettilyon was knocked out, VvT ebb was knocked to 
his knees and respondent 'v~s knocked out, not one 
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of these employe~ got a bruise. Each one, so 
testified. 
The trouble with appellants' theorl.e~ as to the 
issues in the case ""as and is, that thev are unten-
able, and that under the evidence the gi.ving of their 
requested instructions " .. ould have confused and 
misled the jury, and would have invited a mis-
carriag·e of justice. 
E R RO R·S BASED UPO·N INSTRUCTIONS; 
GIVEN. 
On page 58, counsel· complain of the court's In-
struction No. 4, that respondent was a guest at 
Saltair that night, a.nd had a right to remain there 
as long as said resort remained open to the public 
that evening. 
Counsel assume in their argument that the instruc-
tion was that they were guests on the racer, re-
gardless of their actions. Of course it is admitted 
that respondent and her companions were paid 
guests a.t Saltair. They had hee~n dancing and can1e 
down to have a ride on the racer. Is there anything 
in the evidence which would make it improper or 
harmful for the court to instruct the jury that they 
were guests at Saltair Beach ~nd entitled to remain 
there that eYening~ Saltair Beach \Vas not a party 
to the suit. What pr~judice could there b~ front 
such an instruction~ To make the question harm-
ful, th~re would have to be evidence that respondent 
and her companions were requested to leave Salta.ir 
Beach for some reas.on. The racer \Vas a. conces-
sion operated separately from the resort by 
appellants. 
On page 60 of their brief, counsel say the court 
erred in giving~ Instruction No. 5, by "'"hieh thP 
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court told the jury that if they found from the evi-
dence that respondent was apprehensive that her 
husband and brother, or e~ither of them, were in 
danger of bodily harm, and that she interceded in 
the affray to protect either or both, that she was 
justified, and that if they further found from the 
evidence that she 'vas rendered unconscious, by a 
blow from one of app·ellants' employes, the mere 
fact that she participated in the affray would not 
bar her ~rom recovering· damag,es. 
Certainly it is a question for the jury as to whether 
;her husband and brother were in danger, and that 
!Ssue wa.s properly submitted. 
\Counsel's objections to that instruction, and the 
instruction numbered 6, which stated that a p~erson 
is justified in using sufficient force to prevent a 
consummation of injury as a result of apparent 
danger to fa~ly members rais.ed the question in-
volved in their theories of the case. If the Court 
is of the opinion, and we think the evidence. would 
justify no other opinion, that app·ellants' employes 
were in the wrong and that respondent's husband 
and brother or either were in danger, then appel-
lants' whole theory is untenable. In other words, 
if the court was justified in refusing appellants' re-
quested instructions, then. the instructions as given 
on thes.e points \Vere entirely prope;r. VV e think the 
fact is clear and undis.puted that respondent's hus-
·band and brother were being unlawfully and un-
justifiably assaulted and battered. If the Court 
can say that Bettilyon w.as ·in the wrong-, then of 
course appellants~ theory would have been p·roper 
for submission to the jury. But where is the evi-
dence to the effect that Bettilyon was wrong at any 
time, or 'vas the aggres~or at any time 1 
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On the general proposition a.s to the rights and 
duties of a person assaulted, we call the Court's 
attention to 
4 ~m. Juris., Published in 1936, Section 47. 
Page 151, where it is said: 
''The ancient doctrine which makes it the 
duty of a person assaulted to 'retreat to 
the wall' before he is justified in rep.elling 
force by force has been generally modified 
in the United States. The rule no'v gen-
erally accepted, is that one who is assailed 
may meet force with force without retreat-
ing, so long· a.s. he uses. only such force a~ 
is necessary, even though he might with 
absolute safety avoid the threatened injury 
or bodily hann by retreating.'' 
Our contention, of cours.e, is that Cochran h·ad no 
right to attempt to move Bettilyon from the ea~t to 
the west platform, and that his racing across the 
ears from the working platform to the east loading 
platform, and either attempting to strike o~r grab 
hold of Bettilyon constituted an assault, an at-
tempted assault and battery, or an assault and 
hattery. What would couns.el requir~ Bettilyon to 
do when Cochran, after saying, ''I will do just that,'' 
when Bettilyon said why don't you put me a.round 
there, rushed, as he s.aid he did, across. the cars and 
·at Bettilyon? It is clear that he either intended to 
:attempt to move Bettilyon around to the west plat-
form or commit a battPry· on him, and all Bettilyon 
did at any time was to protect himself. According 
to the testimony, not only the three employes of 
appellants, but Slim I~ynch, an outsider, eomn1itted 
nss.aults and hnttrries on Bettilyon. 
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'rhere is no question about respondent's right to 
recover damag·es for her actual injuries, the con-
sequent pain and suffering as a result of the per-
sonal injuries, including a. miscarriage, and the 
damage to her clothing. 
\"1,T e are unable to find any authority which v;ould 
justify the awarding of damages to the respondent 
for the loss of her unborn child. The jury must 
have believed that a miscarriage resulted fron1 the 
battery committed on the respondent, and in vie"\\· 
of this fact, "\Ve do not believe the verdict to have 
been excessive, even if the element of dan1ages, fo1~ 
ihe loss of the unborn child "\Vere elhninated; but, 
of course, the jury were entitled to take that into 
consideration under the instructions, and we must 
assume that some portion of the damages. awarded 
by the jury represented the loss of the unborn child. 
The case is unquestionably one of liability, and the 
personal injuries, and the resulting disability and 
1niscarriage of course would justify a verdict for a 
sum as large as respondent recovered. 
The only suggestion we can make to avoid the 
necessity for a new trial is that this Court give the 
respondent the option to accept a reduction in the 
amount orf the damages recovere-d to an amount to 
be fixed by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYMOND R. BRADY AND 
JOSEPH R. HAAS, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
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